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Abstract. In Morocco, considerable progress has been made in connecting users to water and sanitation. 
However, some households, particularly in urban and surrounding areas, currently cannot be given an 
­individual­connection­to­the­drinking­water­network­due­to­a­lack­of­equipment­and/or­inancial­reasons.­To­
 ensure that they have access to this essential service, these households are generally supplied by means of 
communal tapstands (CTs) where water is made available to them free of charges by the local authorities. 
While these open access CTs provide a temporary connection solution, they do not enable the resource to 
be optimally managed nor equitably shared. Free and open access to all has lead to over-consumption, 
­wastage,­and­use­of­the­resource­by­consumers­outside­the­intended­beneiciary­group.­This­results­in­heavy­
costs for the municipalities concerned and jeopardizes the sustainability of the utility. In response to this 
situation, and in accordance with the recommendations of the international community and of civil society, 
a new type of tapstand “Saqayti”­has­been­developed­to­distribute­prepaid­water­to­beneiciaries­in­Rabat,­
Tangier and Tetouan. Saqaytis­allow­for­targeted­distribution­of­the­utility­to­the­intended­beneiciaries­as­
they are  accessible by means of a chip card distributed to users on a case-by-case basis by the municipal 
authority.­These­users­beneit­from­free­access­to­the­tapstand­up­to­a­monthly­limit­equivalent­to­their­basic­
needs. This paper aims at demonstrating how Saqayti has shown itself to be an innovative addition to 
the provision of individual utility connections, providing the poorest with access to a water and sanitation 
­service­which­meets­international­standards­of­quality,­and­fulills­a­threefold­goal­of­economic,­social­and­
environmental progress.
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1 Introduction
In Morocco’s towns and cities, authorities rely on utility 
 operators (public or private) to implement their policy of 
 access to fresh water and sanitation. The operators centralize 
demand, deliver water to the population in their delegated 
areas and are thus responsible for the sustainable manage-
ment and equitable distribution of the resource. The latter is 
only possible, however, if the same principles apply to the 
entire population in the area: therefore, one of the primary 
goals is to extend public service as widely as possible across 
the operator’s area. One of the crucial targets listed in the 
delegated management contracts, signed in Morocco in 1997, 
is to extend individual connection to 100% of the urban 
households.­ Signiicant­ resources­ have­ therefore­ been­ de-
ployed in recent years to extend provision of fresh water to 
peri-urban areas. However, extending the networks continues 
to face numerous obstacles, including the nature and geo-
graphy­of­certain­districts­as­well­inancial­barriers­found­in­
the heavy investment requirement. As a result, entire districts 
still­do­not­beneit­from­individual­connections­to­fresh­water­
and sanitation networks. In Rabat and its surroundings this 
encompasses 9% of the population, 11% in Tangier and 
10% in Tetouan.
Local authorities have conceived a number of solutions to 
supply those without access to utilities including the 
Installation of free open access tapstands. However, such 
 installations quickly revealed their limitations; thus the op-
erators and the municipalities are eager to develop ways to 
provide better suited services which sustain the public needs, 
minimize wastage, and ensure equitable distribution of the 
resource, while guaranteeing healthy and affordable sources 
of supply to the poorest households.
This paper aims to describe the latest progress and obsta-
cles faced while extending water and sanitation access in 
Morocco,­ deine­ theoretical­ principles­ that­ should­ apply­ to­
Correspondence to: Hascoet Thomas  
Thomas.Hascoet@veoliaservices.ma
T. Hascoet et al: Saqayti: for greater rationalization of tapstand water supplies
2 Field Actions Science Reports
alternative provision systems, present an innovative new 
mode of collective distribution through saqayti1 a managed, 
regulated tapstand delivering prepaid volumes of water, and 
inally­analyze­the­initial­feedback­on­the­new­system.
2 Drinking water provision in Morocco:  
 progress and obstacles
Over past 10 years, Moroccans’ access to drinking water and 
sanitation services has seen important improvements. 
However,­signiicant­efforts­are­still­required,­mainly­in­un-
derprivileged urban and surrounding areas and particularly in 
informal settlements that have grown up spontaneously as a 
result of rural exodus. In May 2005, King Mohammed VI 
launched a National Initiative for Human Development 
(NIHD),­ with­ the­ aim­ of­ ighting­ poverty­ and­ helping­ to­
 improve quality of life for all. Local government agencies, 
their supervisory ministries, and the utility operators re-
sponded by joining forces to pilot innovative approaches, 
linking development of water and sanitation services with 
rehabilitation and restructuring of the building environment 
in the poorer districts.
It is with this aim in mind that three agreements for con-
necting almost 100,000 deprived households (approximately 
500 000 to 600 000 inhabitants) from the outskirts of Rabat, 
Tangier and Tetouan to the water and sanitation networks 
were signed in 2005 and 2006. This public private partner-
ship aims to combine the shared determination of the opera-
tors, the government and the communities themselves, to do 
what is required to quicken the pace of the development of 
fresh water and sanitation provisions, notably by allocating 
ad-hoc funding, by adjusting the contribution expected from 
beneiciary­families­to­socially­affordable­levels,­and­by­sim-
plify­the­associated­paperwork.­In­effect,­the­targets­­deined­
in the agreements amounted to accelerating, into a space of 
ive­years,­almost­all­of­the­subsidized­connections­provided­
for in existing contracts for all three areas over 25 years.
A strong commitment from all parties involved is neces-
sary to meet such objectives, however, commitment is not 
suficient­in­and­of­itself­as­there­are­many­obstacles­which­
must be overcome. First of all, the massive cost of the infra-
structures required to meet the connection targets set for 
Rabat, Tangier and Tetouan amounts to more than 2 billion 
Moroccan dirhams2. As the most deprived households are of-
ten the furthest from the network; and the further a district 
from the main network, the higher the connection cost, this 
calls­ for­ innovative­ and­ inventive­ inancial­ engineering.­
Indeed connection costs include not only the cost of the con-
nection itself but also the costs associated to extending the 
water distribution and the waste water collection networks 
on-site, structural work to create the water transportation net-
works off-site, and a share of the cost of the infrastructure, 
such as pumping stations, reservoirs and decontamination 
plants.­As­well­as­the­impact­on­the­total­inancing­needs­for­
1  “My fountain” in Arabic.
2  1 Moroccan dirham (MAD) = US$ 0.1254 (USD) as of 28 March 2011 
(Source Bank Al Maghrib).
the­project,­this­wide­variety­of­costs­leads­to­signiicant­vari-
ability in the connection cost between different geographical 
areas including districts of the same town, or towns in the 
same region.
Moreover, many of the poorest outlying areas targeted by 
the extension program are not the product of urban planning. 
They are often located in zones with no utility networks, 
sometimes­on­sloping­or­very­dificult­ terrain,­and­ in­areas­
that were not given prior authorization for building. 
Connecting them to the networks therefore requires an ex-
plicit political will to develop and legitimize these districts, 
adding again to the connection costs. The operators who seek 
to connect these households are also faced with land owner-
ship issues, especially in the context of widespread property 
speculation in many of Morocco’s cities. These disputes over 
land ownership and legitimacy of the settlements can consid-
erably increases connection times.
Finally given the cost of the related investments, the water 
supply networks must be designed to last, therefore connec-
tion is only possible for the less precarious dwellings. As 
such it is not feasible to invest in connecting settlements 
which are destined to disappear in the short to medium term 
due to the impermanence of many of the structures of the 
poorest inhabitants (slums or precarious dwellings).
The mechanisms put in place by the authorities and the 
 operators within the framework of the NIHD agreements 
have addressed some of these issues by proposing innova-
tive­inancing­solutions,­by­determining­and­authorizing­the­
supply of a series of priority districts, by facilitating col-
laboration between the main actors of urban development, 
and by streamlining the associated administrative proce-
dures.­However,­ it­ remains­necessary­to­deine­an­alterna-
tive, if temporary, drinking water supply solution, due to the 
 conjunction of several remaining obstacles:
•­ Unsolved­land­ownership­issues;
•­ Dificulties­in­coordinating­the­numerous­development­
agencies and partners;
•­ The­presence­in­some­districts­of­dwellings­too­unstable­
for a lasting connection;
•­ Households­with­insuficient­inancial­resources,­­despite­
the efforts made to reduce the connection fee;
•­ Complex­legal­or­family­situations­with­the­occupants­
of certain dwellings;
•­ Absence­of­development­plans;
•­ And,­simply,­the­fact­that­the­program­is­spread­over­a­
long timeframe.
To date, these households that are being temporarily ex-
cluded from the connection programs for the above reasons 
generally have access to water through open access commu-
nal tapstands. The water at these tapstands is delivered free 
of charge, with no restrictions on access or on volume. The 
 associated consumption is invoiced to the municipalities 
who consequently subsidize it as a grant.
However, even though this means provides a temporary 
 solution, it also poses a number of problems. First and 
T. Hascoet et al: Saqayti: for greater rationalization of tapstand water supplies
3www.factsreports.org
foremost, unregulated access to unlimited volumes attracts 
“freeloaders”, such as entrepreneurs and ordinary consum-
ers who have their own individual connections, who extract 
 water often for non-domestic purposes. They monopolize 
 access to the CT sometimes for hours on end, night and day, 
lengthening the chore of water-fetching for households, 
who are then forced to obtain water from alternative sources 
of uncertain quality, including wells and water-sellers, or 
from more distant CTs. These freeloaders aggravate the 
problem of over-consumption inherent in unrestrained and 
unlimited access. 
In addition, the open access CTs are often poorly main-
tained,­ leaking­or­vandalized,­ resulting­ in­ signiicant­water­
losses, contrary to the goal of preserving collective resources 
and the environment. The lack of any means of control over 
CT consumption also results in large bills for the municipali-
ties, often incommensurate with their budget provisions. This 
has­a­signiicant­ impact­on­cost­ recovery­for­ the­operators:­
high­inancial­charges,­additional­to­the­costs­of­the­service­
are generated by long overdue invoices, as a result of munici-
palities­signiicant­and­recurrent­budget­overlows,­jeopardiz-
ing the sustainability of the utility and, thereby, the fair and 
equitable sharing of water resources.
The use of free tapstands, generally a temporary and partial 
solution to supply water to the poorest households, poses 
problems for rational and sustainable management and for 
equitable sharing of water resources. For this reason, Veolia 
Environnement Morocco3­conducted­studies­to­deine­a­solu-
tion to provide guaranteed exclusive access for the poorest 
households, while minimizing waste and over-consumption, 
and which can complement the subsidized individual connec-
tions while reducing the associated unaccounted for water 
cost to municipalities.
3 Principles and recommendations for a pricing  
 policy adapted to non-individual supply
In the case of tapstands, as happens all too often, experiments 
with­ free­ supply­ lead­ to­ a­ lack­ of­ suficient­ equipment,­
 gradual deterioration of the service, inadequate maintenance, 
and over-consumption, and thus to increased stress on the 
 resource and on the environment. One possible solution 
seems to be to charge customers – even the very poorest – for 
at least part of the cost of the service, within the bounds of 
social affordability.
According to Whittington (2006), the pricing of drinking 
water should strike a balance between the four following 
objectives:
1 Acceptable cost recovery: on aggregate, tariffs faced 
by consumers should produce revenue at least equal to 
the­inancial­costs­of­supply,­without­causing­cash­low­
or­inancing­dificulties­for­the­utility.­Supplying­water­
3  In Morocco, Veolia Environnement has been a delegated provider of 
water, sanitation and electricity services for the Wilayas of Rabat-Sale, 
Tangier and Tetouan since 2002.
via free tapstands puts intolerable stress on the balance 
of pricing policy. Abuse, notably by “freeloaders”, dis-
turbs the equilibrium between the revenue stream and 
the costs associated with providing the public service. 
Furthermore public authorities being unable to budget 
their expenses, invoice payments occur regularly with a 
signiicant­delay­and­thus­generate­additional­inancial­
costs to the service. The new pricing system should 
therefore aim to redress the balance of pricing policy.
2 Economic eficiency: Prices should be set in such a 
way­as­ to­ signal­ to­ consumers­ the­inancial,­ environ-
mental, and other costs that their decisions to use water 
impose on the rest of the system and on the economy.
 In practice, in standard pricing systems, this means 
making the volumetric charge equal to the marginal 
cost of:
a) bringing one additional cubic meter of water into a 
city, and delivering it to a particular customer;
b) the stress that the cubic meter places on the envi-
ronment (the scarcity price of the resource, includ-
ing the opportunity costs associated with using it 
for public needs, and the estimated environmental 
cost of discharging the used water into the natural 
environment and, where applicable, the cost of 
 collecting and treating waste water).
 In the case of a tapstand, consumers need to be made 
aware – by means of a pricing or alert mechanism 
which­ remains­ to­ be­ deined­ –­ of­ the­ cost­ of­ their­
 decision to open a tap for the system as a whole. The 
alert­ could­ be­ inancial­ in­ nature,­ consisting­ in­ the­
 introduction of a charge, but it could also consist in 
 creating a sense of scarcity, to instill value into the 
 water distributed.
3 Equity: Pricing should be identical for similar consum-
ers, and different for dissimilar consumers. This usually 
means that users pay monthly water bills that are pro-
portionate to the costs they impose on the utility by 
their water use. Under this principle, it would be legiti-
mate for users of temporary, non-individual drinking 
water­solutions­to­beneit­from­special­pricing.
4 Affordability: Tariffs should guarantee access to water 
for the poor, regardless of their income level, at least to 
the extent of covering their basic needs. These consid-
erations have led to recommendations that tariffs be 
kept low, at least for the poor.
However, establishing a pricing policy for the supply of 
drinking water to the poorest sections of society is often a 
sensitive issue. The switch from an abundant free supply to a 
regulated paying supply, while offering a solution to several 
of the problems encountered with tapstands, must be intro-
duced progressively and in accordance with the needs and 
expectations­ of­ the­ target­ populations.­The­ speciic­ pricing­
system is the subject of heated debate in civil society, and of 
recommendations by the international community (United 
Nations Development Program, 2006; Organization for 
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Economic Cooperation and Development, 2008). There is 
some degree of consensus, however, on very low prices, and 
on free supply of drinking water for the poorest, at least to 
cover their basic needs. On the principle that all citizens must 
have­access­to­suficient­resources­to­meet­their­basic­needs­
and to live with dignity, both the World Health Organization 
(WHO) and the United Nations Development Program 
(UNPD) recommend a free allocation of 20 liters of water per 
person per day (Joint Monitoring Program State, WHO 2011, 
UNDP 2006). In Morocco, this allocation would amount, for 
the urban and surrounding areas of the largest cities, to about 
3­cubic­meters­a­month­(assuming­an­average­of­ive­persons­
per household). The UNPD also suggests that expenditure on 
drinking water for basic needs should not exceed 3% of a 
household’s income (UNDP 2006). For the greater Tangier 
conurbation, a 2003 socio-economic study (Roger, 2003) as-
sessed the average income of the poorest households at about 
1,900 MAD a month, just over 5 USD per person per day. 
Their expenditure on basic requirements should therefore not 
exceed 50-60 MAD per month.
4 Saqayti, a regulated prepaid water  
 management system for the poorest users
It is on the basis of these recommendations that the saqayti 
tapstand was developed. The key-operated saqayti (Figures 1 
and 2) is made exclusively available to a target population, 
considered by the authorities as the most deprived. To obtain 
water, the users must introduce a key containing a smart card, 
which is credited in advance with a prepaid volume of water 
(allowance being invoiced to the local authorities). Each ex-
traction volume is recorded on the chip and each time the tap-
stand is used, the volume remaining in credit is displayed on a 
built-in digital screen. If the prepaid total is consumed in full, 
the­beneiciary­must­go­to­a­branch­ofice­and­top­up­the­key.­
To date, 19 such tapstands have been installed in Morocco 
in the municipalities of Skhirat, Temara, Sale, Tangier and 
Martil. Prior to their installation, each municipality identi-
ies­ and­ lists­ the­ deprived­ households­ that­ can­ not­ have­
­access­to­an­individual­connection­for­inancial,­structural­or­
other reasons (indivisibility of property, lack of approval 
from the landlord etc.) and who need access to the installa-
tion.­This­identiication­is­based­on­both­economic­status­and­
on an individual case analysis, at the discretion of the mu-
nicipalities who remain the ultimate decision makers about 
who­ beneits­ from­ the­ grant.­ Each­ of­ these­ households­
(752 as of April 2011) is then given a key with which to oper-
ate the tapstand. This amounts to an average of 40 house-
holds per tapstand, depending on the type of tapstand and 
the neighborhood. Keys are currently credited every month 
with a volume of 4 to 6 m3 (about 30 to 40 l/person/day), 
prepaid­by­the­ ­municipalities,­allowing­the­beneiciaries­ to­
meet their basic needs free of charge. To avoid resorting to 
unsafe sources, once the allocated credit is completely con-
sumed by the household, the key can be topped up by its 
beneiciary­at­any­­commercial­agency­including­mobile­units­
set up to offer commercial services within areas where regu-
lar agencies are lacking. The price of the additional credits is 
in accor with the regular tariff which also includes 
a subsidized “social trench”. Under the subsidy up to 6m3 
water is sold by the operator at a price that is inferior to the 
price of the water produced4 (it therefore does not include 
conveyance or  operating costs).
In this form, the saqayti complies with the four principles:
1 Acceptable cost recovery: While proposing a pricing 
solution tailored to the poorest, this system enables 
4  In­Morocco,­Water­ is­ produced­ by­ the­ national­ producer,­ the­Ofice­
National de l’Eau Potable (ONEP). So practically, inside this “social 
tariff band”, water is sold by the operator at a price that is lower than the 
selling price by the ONEP and that does not include adduction and 
 operating costs. In this economical model, under 6m3 per month, water 
is thus subsidized by large consumers (who consume more than 6m3 
per month). 
Figure 1. A saqayti tapstand in Tangier.
Figure 2. Saqayti tapstands in Tangier: water distribution is 
activated by a smart card.
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municipalities to rationalize spending on drinking wa-
ter. Indeed, the pricing policy is balanced by limiting 
the­free­monthly­allowance­to­a­predeined­volume­and­
a­restricted­list­of­beneiciaries.­Tapstand­expenditure,­
which no longer exceeds the freely allocated unit 
­volume­ multiplied­ by­ the­ number­ of­ beneiciaries,­ is­
therefore predictable and the authorities can now  budget 
accurately their associated expenses and plan on time 
payments of the associated invoices to the operator;
2 Economic eficiency: Allocating­ a­ ixed­ maximum­
volume­of­free­water,­and­enabling­the­beneiciaries­to­
monitor the amount remaining, gives people a sense of 
the scarcity of the resource. This, combined with the 
transition to normal pricing beyond the 4 to 6 m3 allow-
ance, helps to give value to drinking water and to make 
the­beneiciaries­aware­of­the­costs­involved;
3 Equity: This solution is aimed at the poorest popula-
tion households, who cannot be supplied individually 
in the short term and who consume less than 4 to 6 m3 
of drinking water a month. It is therefore a socially 
­equitable­tariff­designed­speciically­for­particular­con-
sumers who cannot be supplied by the standard system;
4 Affordability:­ The­ supply­ of­ the­ beneiciaries’­ basic­
needs (an average of 30 to 40 l/person/day, compared 
with the UNPD recommendation of 20 l) is affordable, 
being free of charge. Furthermore, additional volumes 
are sold at a price that is inferior to the price of the 
 water produced. 
Freeloading meanwhile, is prevented, which helps to 
 reduce waiting times, and consequently the length of the 
 water-fetching chore. Increasing the disposable time of the 
beneiciary­households­for­other­activities,­ it­also­ improves­
their quality of life. Additionally, it helps to target municipal 
aid by providing a free service for those who really need it, 
enabling the resulting budget savings to be allocated else-
where. Abusive consumption is avoided, and as the valve 
shuts off automatically when the key is taken out, wastage at 
the tap is avoided.
Saqayti seems therefore to be a practically appropriate 
 solution for the collective and temporary supply of drinking 
water­ to­ populations­ that­ cannot­ beneit­ from­ individual­
connections. By progressively giving value to drinking wa-
ter through scarcity, and by making it necessary for house-
holds to monitor their consumption, the system also paves 
the way for a gradual transition to individual supply. Finally, 
this  approach reduces the stress on the resource from over- 
consumption and wastage, and thus preserves the environ-
ment as part of the threefold goal of economic, social and 
environmental progress.
The­ irst­ saqayti was installed in Temara in November 
2006 and as of March 2011, 19 have been installed around 
Rabat, Salé, Tangier and Tetouan. In the summer of 2008, a 
survey­was­conducted­on­67%­of­the­beneiciary­households.­
This­survey­conirmed,­irst­of­all,­the­extreme­dependency­of­
these households on the tapstand, which constitutes the sole 
source of water for 96% of them. And yet consumption rates 
for the saqayti are on average a quarter of the conventional 
CTs they replaced. The average monthly consumption for the 
three CTs replaced in Veolia Envi ronnement Morocco’s area 
in Rabat fell from 1125 m3/month to 294 m3/month5 (Figure 3). 
Consumption at some saqayti was even found to have fallen 
down to 20%, or in rare cases as low as 2%, of the consump-
tion of previous conventional tapstands. This represents both 
signiicant­ reduction­ in­ the­ extraction­ of­ the­ resource,­ and­
concrete substantial savings for the municipalities which 
 subsidize its consumption.
Thus­far­one­third­(33%)­of­the­beneiciaries­regularly­use­
up their entire allocation over a month, and between the instal-
lation­of­the­irst­saqayti in 2006 and March 2011 only 36 keys 
had to be topped up before the end of the month– solidarity 
5  The standpipes installed in Tangier and Tetouan are too recent as yet for 
a meaningful analysis of consumption rates.
Figure 3. Comparative between conventional and saqayti tapstands. Comparative consumption rates: 3 conventional CTs vs. 
the saqayti that replaced them around Rabat.
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between neighbors currently comes into play when someone 
runs­out­of­credit.­Moreover,­77%­of­the­beneiciary­house-
holds­ declare­ themselves­ satisied­with­ the­ freely­ allocated­
volume. 6 m3 seems therefore to be adequate for these house-
holds, and the number of households using up their  allocation 
could­probably­be­ reduced­by­educating­benei­ciaries­about­
the optimal use of the volume allocated to them.
The­beneiciaries­state­that­the­duration­of­the­water­chore­
has been substantially reduced: 50% declared waiting for 
less than 5 minutes, compared with 17% before the saqayti 
was installed. Additionally,­the­targeting­of­the­beneiciaries­
has tended to optimize the location of the tapstand, bringing 
it­­closer­to­the­beneiciary­households.­This­represents­sig-
niicant­improvement­for­the­beneiciary­households­in­terms­
of time saved and quality of the water consumed. Indeed, as 
the distance to the source has decreased and the methods of 
carrying the water are improved, more water is used for 
 other purposes than drinking including cleaning and hy-
giene.­Additionally,­the­ease­of­access­leads­to­beneiciaries­
renewing their supply more frequently. The reduced storage 
 periods of the water subsequently increase the quality of the 
water consumed. 
The­introduction­of­a­speciic­pricing­policy­for­the­users­of­
these CTs was designed to pave the way for a transition to 
individualized drinking water supply management. In this 
­respect,­one­of­the­primary­aims­was­to­give­beneiciaries­a­
sense of responsibility for the value of water. This objective 
has been met, as 72% of users claim to monitor their con-
sumption of potable water closely. This represents a major 
change in the behavior of these households, as such monitor-
ing was impossible when the water was delivered through 
conventional tapstands. Moreover, 56% of the households 
say that they now pay attention to the notion of water wast-
age, and 17% use some of their leftover water for non-food 
purposes, instead of throwing it away as before.
By mitigating the more negative aspects of non-individual 
drinking­water­supply,­this­mechanism­helps­to­signiicant-
ly­ improve­people’s­quality­of­ life.­This­ is­relected­in­the­
high overall satisfaction level, with almost all of the house-
holds­declaring­they­are­satisied­with­the­installation.­The­
level of satisfaction is not, however, total (only 24% describe 
themselves­as­“very­satisied”).­Some­of­the­disadvantages­
of  collective supply still persist, and many users therefore 
 aspire, eventually, to an individual connection (in accor-
dance­with­Devoto,­Dulo­2011).­While­the­location­of­the­
new  installations has been optimized, fetching water re-
mains a tiresome chore, due to the geography of the areas 
(scattered­ dwellings,­ on­ sometimes­ very­ dificult­ and­ un-
even terrain), and for some the CT is still a long distance 
away with more than 32% of households living more than 
200 m from the installation.
Meanwhile, unexpected problems, tied in with the new 
practices induced by the installation, have gradually emerged. 
First, some households – those closest to the installation – 
now take water from the CT by means of hosepipes directly 
attached to one of the taps and leading to their house. An un-
spoken­ agreement­ between­ beneiciaries­ prohibits­ anyone­
from monopolizing both taps in this way, but even this is not 
always respected. The non-hosepipe owners complain of 
having to wait longer than with their previous source of sup-
ply, as the hosepipe, being shared between several house-
holds, can be connected for hours at a time. 15% of these 
users, non-hosepipe owning, claim that they wait on average 
for more than an hour at the CT. This divergence, and the 
sense of injustice of those without hosepipes, sometimes 
gives­rise­to­tensions.­A­speciically­adapted­tap­which­will­
make hosepipe connections impossible is currently being 
considered as a solution to this problem.
Additionally, if water is stored for too long, it cannot be 
guaranteed to be drinkable. While using hosepipes enables 
large volumes to be drawn off and stored at a time (46% say 
that they take more than 150 liters per visit), thus reducing 
the frequency of operations, it also leads to longer storage 
times. 24% of households now store their drinking water for 
more than three days, compared to only 8% previously. In 
this case, the practical improvement in the mode of water 
 delivery could, perversely, contribute to deterioration in the 
quality­of­the­water­actually­consumed­by­the­beneiciaries.­
Awareness-raising actions are planned, to sensitize people 
about correct water usage, and the links between water, hy-
giene­and­health.­The­survey­revealed­that­the­beneiciaries­
would be receptive to practical information about good water 
usage, and notably how to make best use of their allotted 
6 m3. Following this implementation phase, Veolia Environ-
nement Morocco also plans to accompany the installation of 
saqayti with an awareness campaign on optimal use of the 
water allowance and good water usage in general. This should 
attenuate the unwanted side effects of the program, and turn 
them­into­an­opportunity­to­make­a­signiicant­improvement­
in­the­hygiene­conditions­of­the­beneiciaries.
These aspects, which cast a slight shadow over the suc-
cess of the new installation currently in development, seem 
to be mainly due to its hybrid nature. For, although it is 
 collective tapstand, it is designed to initiate a transition to-
wards individualized water management. Now that every-
one­is­responsible­for­their­own­consumption,­a­beneiciary­
“delegate” could be appointed to report problems, sugges-
tions or  misuse of the collective installation to the operator 
and be the referent in transmitting some best practice about 
good water usage. For this reason a participatory method of 
management for these CTs is currently being developed. 
The  appointment of a person to act as the primary point of 
contact­not­only­for­the­beneiciaries,­but­also­for­the­opera-
tors and municipalities, channeling issues around misuse, 
maintenance, key top-ups, etc. could be an effective way of 
 addressing these problems. 
Saqayti has been highly successful in the municipalities in 
which it has been installed, and the authorities have repeat-
edly­ shown­ their­ interest­ in­ replacing­ their­ whole­ leet­ of­
conventional tap stands. However, to date only 19 saqayti 
have been installed in Morocco out of more than 800 con-
ventional tap stands currently in use in the sole cities of 
Rabat, Tangier and Tetouan. There still remain key barriers 
to greater adoption of the system such as land and political 
issues: installing saqayti indeed means shrinking the num-
ber of authorized  users of subsidized water which is a source 
of dissatisfaction for the households that have not been 
­chosen­as­beneiciaries.­
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5 Conclusion
Free unregulated tapstands are the means generally used to 
supply drinking water to many of the poorest urban house-
holds­unable­to­beneit­from­an­individual­connection­to­the­
public network. This stems from structural reasons such as 
unstable dwellings or districts, lack of development plans, 
land­ownership­issues,­rough­terrain­or­inancial­reasons­like­
the connection fee. However these free tapstands have sig-
niicant­ environmental,­ social­ and­ economic­ drawbacks.­ In­
addition to over-consumption, which makes unreasonable 
demands on the resource and on the aid dispensed by munici-
palities, the mode of distribution itself can be unsuitable for 
the people it is designed to help. From this observation comes 
saqayti, a solution in keeping with the recommendations of 
international bodies and certain members of civil society on 
the pricing of services to meet the basic needs of the poorest. 
This innovative mechanism maintains free access to drinking 
water­for­the­most­exposed­populations­(in­suficient­quantity­
to cover their basic needs), and even improves the conditions 
of supply and eases some of the pressure on water resources. 
In addition, it also enables more balanced public service de-
livery: reducing municipal expenditures and making them 
predictable,­it­prevents­municipalities­from­budget­overlows.­
Eventually, reduced incomes associated to a decrease in the 
volumes of water invoiced by the operator are compensated 
by­a­signiicant­drop­of­the­inancial­costs­generated­by­long­
overdue accounts. As a result, revenues streams are smoothed 
in a win-win scenario.
By reducing consumption and in ensuring better targeting 
of aid for drinking water supplies to the poorest, the saqayti 
system contributes to rational and sustainable management 
and to equitable distribution of the resource.
Early feedback shows that most of the system’s initial objec-
tives have been met: (i) consumption rates have been reduced 
by almost 75% on average; (ii) free supply is guaranteed for 
the poorest; (iii) the conditions of supply, (notably waiting 
times and the chore of fetching water), have been improved; 
and (iv) consumers are gradually acquiring habits associated 
with individual supply including a sense of  responsibility, an 
awareness of the value of water, and sensitivity to wastage.
As with any new and developing system, further adjust-
ments are required to sustain its success in the long term, such 
as developing means to avoid the use of hosepipes which are a 
source of tension, carrying out awareness  campaigns on water 
use­and­its­link­to­health,­appointing­a­“referent­beneiciary”­to­
ensure pertinent feedback on the  installation (maintenance 
needs, social issues generated by or around the installation, 
technical problems) and make durable the aforementioned 
campaigns.
Yet saqayti has already shown itself to be an innovative 
complement to the subsidized individual connections offer-
ing universal access to a complete range of solutions that 
comply with international standards of service quality, and 
that­ fulill­ the­ threefold­ ambition­of­ economic,­ social­ and­
 environmental progress. Its current success is such that 
 municipalities including Rabat, Sale, Tangier and Tetouan 
have­ shown­ their­ interest­ in­ replacing­ their­ entire­leet­ of­
 conventional tapstands by saqaytis. 
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